It is well known that complete prior ignorance is not compatible with learning, at least in a coherent theory of (epistemic) uncertainty. What is less widely known, is that there is a state similar to full ignorance, that Walley calls near-ignorance, that permits learning to take place. In this paper we provide new and substantial evidence that also near-ignorance cannot be really regarded as a way out of the problem of starting statistical inference in conditions of very weak beliefs. The key to this result is focusing on a setting characterized by a variable of interest that is latent. We argue that such a setting is by far the most common case in practice, and we show, for the case of categorical latent variables (and general manifest variables) that there is a sufficient condition that, if satisfied, prevents learning to take place under prior near-ignorance. This condition is shown to be easily satisfied in the most common statistical problems.
Introduction
Epistemic theories of statistics are often concerned with the question of prior ignorance. Prior ignorance means that a subject, who is about to perform a statistical analysis, has not any substantial belief about the underlying data-generating process. Yet, the subject would like to exploit the available sample to draw some statistical inference, i.e., the subject would like to use the data to learn, moving away from the initial condition of ignorance. This situation is very important as it is often desirable to start a statistical analysis with weak assumptions about the problem of interest, thus trying to implement an objective-minded approach to statistics.
A fundamental question is if prior ignorance is compatible with learning. Walley gives a negative answer for the case of his self-consistent (or coherent) theory of statistics: he shows, in a very general sense, that vacuous prior beliefs lead to vacuous posterior beliefs, irrespective of the type and amount of observed data [Walley (1991), Section 7.3.7] . But, at the same time, he proposes focusing on a slighlty different state of beliefs, called near-ignorance, that does enable learning to take place [Walley (1991) , Section 4.6.9]. Loosely speaking, near-ignorant beliefs are beliefs close but not equal to vacuous (see Section 3). The possibility to learn under prior near-ignorance is shown, for instance, in the special case of the nearignorance prior defining the imprecise Dirichlet model (IDM). This is a popular model used in the case of inference from categorical data generated by a discrete process ([Walley (1996) , Bernard (2005) 
]).
In this paper, we also focus on a categorical random variable X, expressing the outcomes of a multinomial process, but we assume that such a variable is latent. This means that we cannot observe the realizations of X, so we can learn about it only by means of another (not necessarily categorical) variable S, related to X in some known way. Variable S is assumed to be manifest, in the sense that its realizations can be observed (see Section 2).
In such a setting, we introduce a condition in Section 4, related to the likelihood of the observed data, that is shown to be sufficient to prevent learning about X under prior near-ignorance. The condition is very general as it is developed for any prior that models near-ignorance (not only the one used in the IDM), and for very general kinds of relation between X and S. We show then, by simple examples, that such a condition is easily satisfied, even in the most elementary and common statistical problems.
In order to appreciate this result, it is important to realize that latent variables are ubiquitous in problems of uncertainty. It can be argued, indeed, that there is a persistent distinction between (latent) facts (e.g., health, state of economy, color of a ball) and (manifest) observations of facts: one can regard them as being related by a so-called observational process; and the point is that these kinds of processes are imperfect in practice. Observational processes are often neglected in statistics, when their imperfection is deemed to be tiny. But a striking outcome of the present research is that, no matter how tiny the imperfection, provided it exists, learning is not possible under prior near-ignorance.
In our view, the present results raise serious doubts about the possibility to adopt a condition of prior near-ignorance in real, as opposed to idealized, applications of statistics. As a consequence, it may make sense to consider re-focusing the research about this subject on developing models of very weak states of belief that are, however, stronger than near-ignorance.
Categorical Latent Variables
In this paper, we follow the general definition of latent and manifest variables given by [Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh (2004) ]: a latent variable is a random variable whose realizations are unobservable (hidden), while a manifest variable is a random variable whose realizations can be directly observed. The concept of latent variable is central in many sciences, like for example psychology and medicine. [Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh (2004) But what are latent variables in practice? According to [Boorsbom et al. (2002) ], there may be different interpretations of latent variables. A latent variable can be regarded, for example, as an unobservable random variable that exists independently of the observation. An example is the unobservable health status of a patient that is subject to a medical test. Another possibility is to regard a latent variable as a product of the human mind, a construct that does not exist independent of the observation. For example the unobservable state of the economy, often used in economic models. In this paper, we assume the existence of a latent categorical random variable X, with outcomes in X = {x 1 , . . . , x k } and unknown chances θ ∈ Θ :
Suppose now that our aim is to predict, after N realizations of the variable X, the next outcome (or the next N ′ outcomes). Because the variable X is latent and therefore unobservable by definition, the only possible way to learn something about the probabilities of the next outcome is to observe the realizations of some manifest variable S related, in a known way, to the (unobservable) realizations of X. An example of known relationship between latent and manifest variables is the following.
Example 1 We consider a binary medical diagnostic test used to assess the health status of a patient with respect to a given disease. The accuracy of a diagnostic test 1 is determined by two probabilities: the sensitivity of a test is the probability of obtaining a positive result if the patient is diseased; the specificity is the probability of obtaining a negative result if the patient is healthy. Medical tests are assumed to be imperfect indicators of the unobservable true disease status of the patient. Therefore, we assume that the probability of obtaining a positive result when the patient is healthy, respectively of obtaining a negative result if the patient is diseased, are non-zero. Suppose, to make things simpler, that the sensitivity and the specificity of the test are known. In this example, the unobservable health status of the patient can be considered as a binary latent variable X with values in the set {Healthy, Ill}, while the result of the test can be considered as a binary manifest variable S with values in the set {Negative result, Positive result}. Because the sensitivity and the specificity of the test are known, we know how X and S are related. ♦
We continue discussion about this example later on, in the light of our results, in Example 2 of Section 4.
Near-Ignorance Priors
Consider a categorical random variable X with outcomes in X = {x 1 , . . . , x k } and unknown chances θ ∈ Θ. Suppose that we have no relevant prior information about θ and we are therefore in a situation of prior ignorance. How should we model our prior beliefs in order to reflect the initial lack of knowledge?
Let us give a brief overview of this topic in the case of coherent models of uncertainty, such as Bayesian probability and Walley's theory of coherent lower previsions.
In the traditional Bayesian setting, prior beliefs are modeled using a single prior probability distribution. The problem of defining a standard prior probability distribution modeling a situation of prior ignorance, a so-called noninformative prior, has been an important research topic in the last two centuries 2 and, despite the numerous contributions, it remains an open research issue, as illustrated by [Kass and Wassermann (1996) ]. See also ] for recent developments and complementary considerations. There are many principles and properties that are desirable to model a situation of prior ignorance and that have been used in past research to define noninformative priors. For example Laplace's symmetry or indifference principle has suggested, in case of finite possibility spaces, the use of the uniform distribution. Other principles, like for example the principle of invariance under group transformations, the maximum entropy principle, the conjugate priors principle, etc., have suggested the use of other noninformative priors, in particular for continuous possibility spaces, satisfying one or more of these principles. But, in general, it has proven to be difficult to define a standard noninformative prior satisfying, at the same time, all the desirable principles.
In the case of finite possibility spaces, we agree with [De Cooman and Miranda (2006) ] when they say that there are at least two principles that should be satisfied to model a situation of prior ignorance: the symmetry principle and the embedding principle. The symmetry principle states that, if we are completely ignorant a priori about θ, then we have no reason to favour one possible outcome of X to another, and therefore our probability model on θ should be symmetric. This principle recalls Laplace's symmetry or indifference principle that, in the past decades, has suggested the use of the uniform prior as standard noninformative prior. The embedding principle states that, for each possible event A, the probability assigned to A should not depend on the possibility space X in which A is embedded. In particular, the probability assigned a priori to the event A should be invariant with respect to refinements and coarsenings of X . It is easy to show that the embedding principle is not satisfied by the uniform distribution. How should we model our prior ignorance in order to satisfy these two principles? [Walley (1991) ] gives a compelling answer to this question: he proves 3 that the only probability model consistent with coherence and with the two principles is the vacuous probability model, i.e., the model that assigns, for each non-trivial event A, lower probability P(A) = 0 and upper probability P(A) = 1. It is evident that this model cannot be expressed using a single probability distribution. It follows that, to model properly and in a coherent way a situation of prior ignorance, we need imprecise probabilities.
The particular choice of M 0 in the IDM implies vacuous prior expectations for all functions f (θ) = θ N ′ i , for all N ′ ≥ 1 and all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, i.e., E(θ
It follows that the particular near-ignorance prior M 0 used in the IDM implies vacuous prior probabilities for each possible outcome of the variable X. It can be shown that this particular set of priors satisfies both the symmetry and embedding principles.
But what is the difference between the vacuous probability model and the the near-ignorance prior used in the IDM? In fact, although both models produce vacuous prior probabilities and both models satisfy the symmetry and embedding principles, the IDM yields posterior probabilities that are not vacuous, while the vacuous probability model produces only vacuous posterior probabilities. The answer to this question is the reason why we use the term near-ignorance: in the IDM, although we are completely ignorant about the possible outcomes of the variable X, we are not completely ignorant about the chances θ, because we assume a particular class of prior distributions, i.e., the Dirichlet distributions for a fixed value of s.
Limits of Learning under Prior Near-Ignorance
Consider a sequence of independent and identically distributed (IID) categorical latent variables (X i ) i∈N with outcomes in X and unknown chances θ ∈ Θ, and a sequence of independent manifest variables (S i ) i∈N . We assume that a realization of the manifest variable S i can be observed only after an (unobservable) realization of the latent variable X i and that the probability distribution of S i given X i is known for each i ∈ N. Furthermore, we assume S i to be independent of the chances θ of X i given X i . Define the random variables X := (X 1 , . . . , X N ), S := (S 1 , . . . , S N ) and
We focus on the problem of predictive inference. 5 Suppose that we observe a dataset s of realizations of manifest variables S 1 , . . . , S N related to the (unobservable) dataset x ∈ X N of realizations of the variables X 1 , . . . , X N . Using the notation defined above we have S = s and X = x. Our aim is to predict the outcomes of the next N ′ variables X N +1 , . . . , X N +N ′ . In particular, given x ′ ∈ X N ′ , our aim is to calculate P(X ′ = x ′ | S = s) and P(X ′ = x ′ | S = s). To simplify notation, when no confusion is possible, we denote in the rest of the paper S = s with s and X ′ = x ′ with x ′ . The (in)dependence structure can be depicted graphically as follows:
Modelling our prior ignorance about the parameters θ with a near-ignorance prior M 0 and denoting by n ′ := (n ′ 1 , . . . , n ′ k ) the frequencies of the dataset x ′ , we have
where, according to Bayes theorem,
provided that Θ P(s | θ)p(θ)dθ = 0. Analogously, substituting sup to inf in (3), we obtain
The central problem now is to choose M 0 so as to be as ignorant as possible a priori and, at the same time, to be able to learn something from the observed dataset of manifest variables s. Theorem 1 and the following corollaries yield a first partial solution to the above problem, stating several conditions for learning under prior near-ignorance.
Theorem 1 Let s be given. Consider a bounded continuous function f defined on Θ and denote with f max the Supremum of f on Θ. If the likelihood function P(s | θ)
is strictly positive 6 in each point in which f reaches its maximum value f max and it is continuous in an arbitrary small neighborhood of these points, and M 0 is such that a priori E(f ) = f max , then
Many corollaries to Theorem 1 are listed in Section B of the Appendix. Here we discuss only the most important corollary. Consider, given a dataset x ′ , the particular function
This function is particularly important for
6 The Assumption about P(s | θ) in Theorem 1 can be substituted by the following weaker assumption. For a given arbitrary small δ > 0, denote with Θ δ the measurable set, Θ δ := {θ ∈ Θ | f (θ) ≥ f max − δ}. If P(s | θ) is such that, lim δ→0 inf θ∈Θ δ P(s | θ) = c > 0, then Theorem 1 holds. predictive inference, because its lower and upper expectations correspond to the lower and upper probabilities assigned to the dataset x ′ . It is easy to show that, in this case, the minimum of f is 0 and is reached in all the points θ ∈ Θ with θ i = 0 for some i such that n ′ i > 0, while the maximum of f is reached in a single point of Θ corresponding to the relative frequencies f ′ of the sample x ′ , i.e., at
∈ Θ, and the maximum of f is given by
that vacuous probabilities regarding the dataset x ′ are given by 
In other words, Corollary 1 states a sufficient condition that prevents learning to take place under prior near-ignorance: if the likelihood function P(s | θ) is continuous and strictly positive on Θ, then all the dataset x ′ ∈ X N ′ for which M 0 implies vacuous probabilities have vacuous probabilities also a posteriori, after having observed s. It follows that, if this sufficient condition is satisfied, we cannot use near-ignorance priors to model a state of prior ignorance for the same reason for which, in Section 3, we have excluded the vacuous probability model: because only vacuous posterior probabilities are produced.
The sufficient condition described above is satisfied very often in practice, as illustrated by the following striking examples.
Example 2 Consider the medical test introduced in Example 1 and an (ideally) infinite population of individuals. Denote with the binary variable X i ∈ {H, I} the health status of the i-th individual of the population and with S i ∈ {+, −} the results of the diagnostic test applied to the same individual. We assume that the variables in the sequence (X i ) i∈N are IID with unknown chances (θ, 1 − θ), where θ corresponds to the (unknown) proportion of diseased individuals in the population. Denote with 1 − ε 1 the sensitivity and with 1 − ε 2 the specificity of the test. Then it holds that P(
where (I, H, +, −) denote (patient ill, patient healthy, test positive, test negative). Suppose that we observe the results of the test applied to N different individuals of the population; using our previous notation we have S = s. For each individual we have,
Denote with n s the number of positive tests in the observed sample s. Then, because the variables S i are independent, we have
for each θ ∈ [0, 1] and each s ∈ X N . Therefore, according to Corollary 1, all the predictive probabilities that, according to M 0 , are vacuous a priori remain vacuous a posteriori. It follows that, if we want to avoid vacuous posterior predictive probabilities, then we cannot model our prior knowledge (ignorance) using a nearignorance prior implying some vacuous prior predictive probabilities. This simple example shows that our previous theoretical results raise serious questions about the use of near-ignorance priors also in very simple, common, and important situations.
The situation presented in this example can be extended, in a straightforward way, to the general categorical case and has been studied, in the special case of the near-ignorance prior used in the imprecise Dirichlet model, in [Piatti et al. (2005)] . ♦ Example 2 focuses on discrete latent and manifest variables. In the next example, we show that our theoretical results have important implications also in models with discrete latent variables and continuous manifest variables.
Example 3 Consider the sequence of IID categorical variables (X i ) i∈N with outcomes in X N and unknown chances θ ∈ Θ. Suppose that, for each i ≥ 1, after a realization of the latent variable X i , we can observe a realization of a continuous manifest variable S i . Assume that p(S i | X i = x j ) is a continuous positive probability density, e.g., a normal N(µ j , σ 2 j ) density, for each x j ∈ X . We have
because θ j is positive for at least one j ∈ {1, . . . , N} and we have assumed S i to be independent of θ given X i . Because we have assumed (S i ) i∈N to be a sequence of independent variables, we have,
Therefore, according to Corollary 1, if we model our prior knowledge using a nearignorance prior M 0 , the vacuous prior predictive probabilities implied by M 0 remain vacuous a posteriori. It follows that, if we want to avoid vacuous posterior predictive probabilities, we cannot model our prior knowledge using a near-ignorance prior implying some vacuous prior predictive probabilities. ♦ Examples 2 and 3 raise, in general, serious criticisms about the use of nearignorance priors in practical applications.
The only predictive model in the literature, of which we are aware, where a near-ignorance prior is used successfully to obtain non-vacuous posterior predictive probabilities is the IDM. In the next example, we explain how the IDM avoids our theoretical limitations.
Example 4 In the IDM, we assume that the IID categorical variables (X i ) i∈N are observable. In other words, we have S i = X i for each i ≥ 1 and therefore the IDM is not a latent variable model. Having observed S = X = x, we have
where n i denotes the number of times that x i ∈ X has been observed in x. We have P(X = x | θ) = 0 for all θ such that θ j = 0 for at least one j such that n j > 0 and P(X = x | θ) > 0 for all the other θ ∈ Θ, in particular for all θ in the interior of Θ.
The near-ignorance prior M 0 used in the IDM consists in the set of all the Dirichlet densities dir s,t (θ) for a fixed s > 0 and all t ∈ T , where dir s,t (θ) and T have been defined in (1) and (2).
The particular choice of M 0 in the IDM implies, for each N ′ ≥ 1 and each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, that E(θ
and in particular P(X 1 = x i ) = 0, P(X 1 = x i ) = 1.
It can be shown that other prior predictive probabilities are not vacuous. For example, for i = j, we have
The IDM produces, for each possible observed data set x, non-vacuous posterior predictive probabilities for each possible future data set (see [Walley (1996) ]). This means that our previous theoretical limitations are avoided in some way. To explain this result we consider two cases. We consider firstly an observed data set x where we have observed at least two different outcomes. Secondly, we consider a data set x formed exclusively by outcomes of the same type, in other words, a data set of the type d i . In the first case we have that P(x | θ) = k j=1 θ n j j is equal to zero for θ = e i for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. In fact, θ i = 1 implies θ j = 0 for each j = i and there is at least one j with n j > 0. Therefore, the assumptions of Corollaries 4 and 5 are not satisfied. And in fact the IDM produces non-vacuous posterior predictive probabilities for each data set that, a priori, has vacuous predictive probabilities. On the other hand, all the datasets whose prior predictive probability reaches its maximum in a relative frequency f ∈ Θ such that P(x | f) > 0, are characterized by non-vacuous prior predictive probabilities.
The second case yields similar results. The only difference is that P(
for a given i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. In this case P(x | e i ) = 1 > 0 and in fact, according to Corollaries 4 and 5, we obtain
and consequently, for each j = i and each y = d i ,
But, on the other hand, we obtain
and therefore the posterior predictive probabilities are not vacuous for each possible future data set. ♦ Yet, since the variables (X i ) i∈N are assumed to be observable, the successful application of a near-ignorance prior in the IDM is not helpful in addressing the doubts raised by our theoretical results about the applicability of near-ignorance priors in situations where the variables (X i ) i∈N are latent.
Conclusions
In this paper we have proved a sufficient condition that prevents learning about a latent categorical variable to take place under prior near-ignorance about the datagenerating process.
The condition holds as soon as the likelihood is strictly positive (and continuous), and so is satisfied frequently, even in the simplest settings. Taking into account that the considered framework is very general and pervasive of statistical practice, we regard this result as a form of substantial evidence against the possibility to use prior near-ignorance in real statistical problems. Given that complete prior ignorance is not compatible with learning, as it is well known, we deduce that there is little hope to use any form of prior ignorance to do objective-minded statistical inference in practice.
As a consequence, we suggest that future research efforts should be directed to study and develop new forms of knowledge that are close to near-ignorance but that do not coincide with it. P n ( Θ) := e Θ p n (θ)dθ, Θ ⊆ Θ.
In addition, for a given probability density p on Θ, Finally, with → we denote lim n→∞ .
Theorem 2 Let Θ ⊂ R k be the closed k-dimensional simplex and let (p n ) n∈N be a sequence of probability densities defined on Θ w.r.t. the Lebesgue measure. Let f ≥ 0 be a bounded continuous function on Θ and denote with f max the supremum of f on Θ. For this function define the measurable sets
Assume that (p n ) n∈N concentrates on a maximum of f for n → ∞, in the sense that
then, for all δ > 0, it holds P n (Θ δ ) → 1. 
under the same assumptions of Theorem 2. Then
Remark 1 If f has a unique maximum in θ = θ 0 and L is a function, continuous in an arbitrary small neighborhood of θ = θ 0 , such that L(θ 0 ) > 0, then (6) is satisfied.
B Corollaries to Theorem 1
The following Corollaries to Theorem 1 are necessary to prove Corollary 1, and are useful to understand more deeply the limiting results implied by the use of nearignorance priors with latent variables.
